Adversarial examples that can fool deep models are mainly crafted by adding small perturbations imperceptible to human eyes. There are various optimization-based methods in the literature to generate adversarial perturbations, most of which are time-consuming. AdvGAN, a method proposed by Xiao et al. in IJCAI 2018, employs Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to generate adversarial perturbation with original images as inputs, which is faster than optimization-based methods at inference time. AdvGAN, however, fixes the target classes in the training and we find it difficult to train AdvGAN when it is modified to take original images and target classes as inputs. In this paper, we propose Attack-Inspired GAN (AI-GAN) with a different training strategy to solve this problem. AI-GAN is a two-stage method, in which we use projected gradient descent (PGD) attack to inspire the training of GAN in the first stage and apply standard training of GAN in the second stage. Once trained, the Generator can approximate the conditional distribution of adversarial instances and generate imperceptible adversarial perturbations given different target classes. We conduct experiments and evaluate the performance of AI-GAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Compared with AdvGAN, AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates with similar perturbation magnitudes.
Introduction
Deep neural networks have been intensively applied in various scenarios, including those safety and security critical ones, such as autopilots, face recognition and video surveillance. Despite the mighty capability, recent studies have found that they are vulnerable to adversarial examples . The existence of adversarial examples has greatly challenged the reliability of deep learning models. An attack could be launched by crafting imperceptible perturbations on legiti- * Corresponding Author mate samples, so that the generated adversarial examples can easily fool deep neural networks.
Many researchers have managed to generate such perturbations in different ways, such as box-constrained L-BFGS , Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) , Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [Papernot et al., 2016] and C&W attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] . These attack methods are optimization-based with proper distance metrics L 0 , L 2 and L ∞ to restrict the magnitudes of perturbations and make the presented adversarial examples visually natural. These methods, however, are usually time-consuming and need to access the target models at inference period.
In order to accelerate the generation process, some researchers start to employ generative models to produce adversarial perturbations [Xiao et al., 2018; Poursaeed et al., 2018; Jandial et al., 2019] , or generate adversarial examples directly [Song et al., 2018; Liu and Hsieh, 2019] . AdvGAN proposed by [Xiao et al., 2018] uses Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to generate adversarial perturbations. In AdvGAN, the generator produces adversarial perturbations while the discriminator determines whether generated adversarial examples are realistic. However, targeted classes are determined beforehand in AdvGAN when performing targeted attacks, which constrains the representation ability of GAN. [Liu and Hsieh, 2019] and [Song et al., 2018] utilize GAN to generate adversarial examples for different target classes from latent vector. In their methods, GAN takes a random vector and target classes as inputs and generates adversarial examples without corresponding existing natural images. Such methods are not applicable when the original images are given. To attack a face recognition system, for example, searching corresponding latent vectors of targeted faces is unrealistic. In this paper, we argue that generating adversarial perturbations is more practical than searching in latent space for targeted attacks. And adversarial examples crafted by adding perturbations can supplement existing datasets, which is potentially beneficial to adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] .
To solve the aforementioned problems, we propose a new variant of GAN to generate adversarial perturbations conditionally and efficiently, which is named Attack-Inspired GAN (AI-GAN). There are two stages in the training phase of AI-GAN: in the first stage, we jointly train a generator, a discriminator, and an attacker. The attacker is used to inspire the generator to produce effective perturbations quickly in the joint training. The discriminator estimates the similarity between adversarial examples generated by the generator and the attacker. In the second stage, we remove the attacker and apply the standard GAN training strategy. The outputs of the generator are fine-tuned, since the discriminator now estimates the similarity between adversarial examples generated by the generator and original images. As for evaluation of AI-GAN, we first compare the training process of AI-GAN and the modified AdvGAN that takes original samples and target classes as inputs. Then we employ AI-GAN to perform attacks as well as AdvGAN in various experimental settings (semi-whitebox vs. black-box, under defenses or without defenses). From the experiments, we conclude that 1) our model architecture and training strategy are more reasonable than AdvGAN for generating adversarial examples, 2) AI-GAN achieves higher attack rates than AdvGAN under same L ∞ bound of perturbations in various experimental settings.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. Different from AdvGAN, we propose AI-GAN with a two-stage training strategy to generate adversarial examples, which takes less epochs to train for certain success rates (e.g. 90%) and high generation quality than Adv-GAN.
2. Our experiments show that AI-GAN can produce perceptually realistic examples and achieve high attack success rates with different target classes on MNIST (> 97%) and CIFAR-10 (> 92%).
3. We apply AI-GAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10 with different target models and show that AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates than AdvGAN in different experimental settings (semi-whitebox vs. black-box, under defenses vs. no defenses).
Related Work

Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples, which are able to mislead deep neural networks, are first discovered by . They manage to maximize the network's prediction error by adding hardly perceptible perturbations to benign images. Since then, various attack methods have been proposed. developed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to compute the perturbations efficiently using backpropagation. The perturbations could be expressed as η = sign (∇ x J(θ, x, y)), where J(θ, x, y) represents the cross entropy loss function, and is a constant. Thus adversarial examples are expressed as x A = x + η. One intuitive extension of FGSM is Basic Iterative Method [Kurakin et al., 2016] which executes FGSM many times with smaller . [Papernot et al., 2016] proposed Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) with L 0 distance. The saliency map discloses the likelihood of fooling the target network when modifying pixels in original images. Optimization-based methods have been proposed to generate quasi-imperceptible perturbations with constraints in different distance metrics. [Car-lini and Wagner, 2017] designed a set of attack methods. The objective function is minimizing δ p + c · f (x + δ), where c is an constant and p could be 0, 2 or ∞. [Chen et al., 2017] also proposed an algorithm approximating the gradients of targeted models based on Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO). [Madry et al., 2018 ] introduced a convex optimization method called Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to generate adversarial examples, which is proved to be the strongest one-order attack. However, such methods are usually time-consuming because the optimization process is slow, and they are only able to generate perturbations once a time.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
GAN is firstly proposed by ] and has achieved great success in various tasks Reed et al., 2016] . GAN consists of two competing neural networks with different objectives, called the discriminator D(x) and the generator G(z) respectively. The training phase could be seen as a min-max game of the discriminator and the generator. The generator is trained to generate fake images to fool the discriminator while the discriminator tries to classify the real images and the fake images. Usually the generator and the discriminator are trained alternatively while the other one is fixed. The original objective function is denoted as 3 Our Approach
Problem Definition
Consider a classification network f trained on dataset X ⊆ R n , with n being the number of features. And suppose (x i , y i ) is the i th instance in the training data, where x i ∈ X is generated from some unknown distribution P data , and y i ∈ Y is the ground truth label. The classifier f is trained on natural images and achieves a high accuracy. The goal of an adversary is to generate an adversarial example x a , which is able to let f output a wrong prediction and looks similar to x in terms of some distance metrics. We use L ∞ to bound the magnitude of perturbations. There are two types of such attacks: given an instance (x, y), the adversary makes f (x a ) y, which is called untargeted attack; or f (x a ) = t given a target class t, which is called targeted attack. Targeted attack is more challenging than untargeted attack, and we mainly focus on targeted attack in this paper.
Proposed Framework
We There are two main differences between AI-GAN and Ad-vGAN according to their architectures. First, AdvGAN fixes target classes in training, which constrains the generator to produce only one-class targeted adversarial perturbations, while AI-GAN takes the original images and target classes as inputs, and can produce adversarial perturbations for different target classes. Second, we find simply embedding target classes with original images in AdvGAN is difficult to train, as discussed later Section 4.1. Thus we propose AI-GAN, a two-stage method, to solve this problem. We train GAN and an attacker jointly in the first stage to generate adversarial examples quickly and fine-tune it in the second stage. In AI-GAN, Generator G takes a clean image x and the target class label t as inputs to generate adversarial perturbations G(x, t). t are sampled randomly. Then an adversarial example can be obtained with x + G(x, t) and sent to Discriminator D. There are two stages when training AI-GAN. In the first stage, D distinguishes the two types of adversarial examples x + G(x, t) and A(x, t), which are generated by the Generator G and the Attacker A respectively. Target classes are the same for G and A. In the second stage, adversarial examples generated by A are substituted with original samples, and then standard GAN training is applied. The target classifier C takes x + G(x, t) as its input and outputs corresponding logits. The logits are used to calculate a loss L C adv , which indicates the effectiveness of generated adversarial examples.
The objective function of our model is expressed as
where λ and γ are weights of different objectives. We explain L C adv , L GAN , and L hinge as follows. L C adv is the loss of fooling target classifier C and is leveraged to generate adversarial examples, which is expressed as 1
where t is the target class and C represents the loss function used when training target classifier C.
L GAN is adversarial loss used in GAN's training , which is used to encourage generated samples similar to the original samples.
For the first stage, L GAN is expressed as
For the second stage, L GAN is expressed as
L hinge is called Hinge loss to bound the magnitude of the perturbations, which is common in prior work [Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Xiao et al., 2018] .
where c denotes a user-defined constant. 1 We denote E x ≡ E x∼P data for simplicity.
In this section, we evaluate AI-GAN in two ways. and use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [Madry et al., 2018] as an attacker in the training process. Note that any optimization-based attack method in the literature can be used theoretically. We use Wasserstein Metric and Gradient Penalty proposed in [Gulrajani et al., 2017] to stabilize the training of GAN. Stop epoch for the first stage and the iteration number of PGD are hyper-parameters, which are set to 10 and 40 respectively. We apply C&W loss [Carlini and Wagner, 2017] and set confidence κ = 0 in our experiments. We use Adam as our solver [Kingma and Ba, 2014] , with a batch size of 64 and learning rate of 0.001.
Target Models in the Experiments. We select two models as target models on different datasets. For MNIST, we use model A from [Tramèr et al., 2018] 
Advantages of AI-GAN
As we all know, the training process of GAN in practice is usually unstable and time-consuming. In our method, an attacker is trained jointly with GAN to improve the training process. We argue that our framework is non-trivial. Adv-GAN learns only the distribution of adversarial examples for one target class. When performing attacks with different target classes, the generator is required to learn the conditional distribution of adversarial instances, which is more challenging. According to our experiments, it is difficult to train Adv-GAN when simply embedding target classes and original images. In AI-GAN, we employ an attacker to perform attacks in first stage, which can inspire the generator and shrink the search space. We conduct the experiments of AI-GAN and AdvGAN on MNIST in semi-whitebox settings. Models A and B under no defenses are used as target models. First, we test these two methods and visualize attack success rates during training in Figure 3 . Note that we modify AdvGAN in this section so that it takes original images and target classes as inputs. As shown in Figure 3 , we evaluate the attack success rates of two methods for 200 training epochs. We can see that AI-GAN needs less epochs than AdvGAN to satisfy a certain attack success rate (e.g. 90%). The attacker gives a correct direction to the generator to search for adversarial examples, which makes the generator produce adversarial examples quickly. As for training time, AI-GAN takes much time in the first stage due to PGD attack. In our experiments, AI-GAN takes 300s and 37s per epoch on average in two stages while AdvGAN takes 35s per epoch on average. But more important, the first stage of AI-GAN plays a key role in increasing attack success rates as shown in Figure 3 . Second, as shown in Figure 4 , we sample some original images and adversarial examples to compare the generation quality of two methods. These samples are generated on MNIST after training 10 epochs (Stage 1) and 100 epochs (Stage 2), which are shown in second and third column in Figure 4 . In Stage 1, it is hard to tell samples generated by which method are better in quality. But in Stage 2, perturbations generated by AI-GAN are visually smaller than that in Stage 1, while there is little progress of AdvGAN. Correspondingly, adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN are more realistic than that generated by AdvGAN after training 100 epochs.
In summary, Figure 3 and Figure 4 appeals that AI-GAN can produce adversarial examples with higher success rates and qualities than AdvGAN within same training epochs. The two-stage training and inspiration of the attacks applied in AI-GAN contribute to generate realistic adversarial examples quickly, which makes AI-GAN outperform AdvGAN.
Original Images
Stage 1 (Epoch 10) Stage 2 (Epoch 100) Figure 4 : Original images and adversarial examples sampled in two stages from left to right. The first row is generated by AI-GAN and the second row is generated by AdvGAN. Original images are shown on the diagonal and the numbers on the left denote target classes for each row.
Attack in Semi-Whitebox Setting
We conduct attacks to classifiers with different architectures for MNIST and CIFAR-10 under different conditions: under defenses or no defenses.
Attack without defenses
We apply AI-GAN to perform semi-whitebox attack against different models on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The performance of AI-GAN is shown in Table 2 . From the table we can see that AI-GAN achieves high attack success rates with different target classes. For MNIST, the average attack success rates are 99.38% and 99.71% for model A and B. And the success rates are no less than 97% in all classes. For CIFAR-10, the average attack success rates are 96.07% and 96.86% for ResNet18 and ResNet34. The attack success rates for all classes are above 90%. Compared to AdvGAN, average attack success rates of AI-GAN are higher when against most models both on MNIST and CIFAR-10 as shown in Table 3 . Note that once AI-GAN is trained, it could generate adversarial examples under different conditions, while we need to train 10 AdvGANs to attack with 10 different target classes. Randomly selected adversarial examples generated are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 . We make a comparison between adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN and Adv-GAN on MNIST in Figure 5 . In some characters like 0 and 8, AI-GAN is better than AdvGAN apparently. And Figure 6 shows adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN with different target models on CIFAR-10.
Attack Under defenses
There are various defenses proposed against adversarial examples in the literature [Madry et al., 2018; Figure 5 : Adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN (Row 1) and AdvGAN (Row 2) for different models on MNIST with different target classes (same as Figure 3 ). From left to right, target models are model A and B for each column. Original images are shown on the diagonal. Samangouei et al., 2018] , and adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] is widely accepted as the most effective way. For evaluation of adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN, we select three adversarial training methods to improve robustness of target models. The first adversarial training method is proposed by based on FGSM. The objective function is expressed as J(θ, x, y) = αJ(θ, x, y) + (1 − α)J (θ, x + sign (∇ x J(θ, x, y)) . The second method is Ensemble Adversarial Training extended from the first method by [Tramèr et al., 2018] , and we use two different models as static models to generate adversarial examples on each dataset. And the third method is proposed by [Madry et al., 2018] , which employs PGD as a universal first-order adversary.
We evaluate the performance of AI-GAN and AdvGAN quantitatively under these defense methods. As shown in Table 4 , AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rate than AdvGAN when target models are trained with defenses.
Attack in Black-box Setting
In this section, we use AI-GAN to perform attacks in blackbox setting. We assume the adversary is not aware of the defense strategies but could get the outputs of target models. Since the black-box attack is based on dynamic distillation strategy, a distilled model f d is constructed in our experiments. And when applying dynamic distillation during training, local model f d is updated every time after updating the generator. The advantage of dynamic distillation is the generator can approximate the predictions of target models when We apply AI-GAN and AdvGAN to generate adversarial examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The attack success rates for different defense strategies are shown in Table 5 . On MNIST, AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates than AdvGAN does under all three defense strategies. This means adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN have a great transferability. On CIFAR-10, AI-GAN also shows stronger attack abilities in most cases.
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Conclusion
In this paper, we propose AI-GAN to generate adversarial examples where GAN is jointly trained with an attacker. There are two stages in our AI-GAN framework: in the first stage, the attacker plays as a guide of the generator and inspires the training of generator; in the second stage, the attacker is removed and the generator is encouraged to generate adversarial examples similar to original samples. Once our AI-GAN is trained, the generator can produce imperceptible perturbations given different samples and target classes, and preserve high attack success rates as well. Similarly to Adv-GAN, AI-GAN can perform attacks in both semi-whitebox and black-box settings without knowledge of defenses in place. And AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates than AdvGAN under same bound of perturbations.
